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I. Introduction
A. UNITED STATES GRANTS CHINA PNTR
On October 10, 2000, President Clinton signed into law legislation granting China Per-
manent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and ending the annual Congressional review of
China's trade status, the culmination of fourteen years of negotiations, and a protracted
struggle on Capitol Hill.' The U.S. Senate passed the legislation overwhelmingly on Sep-
tember 19, 2000, joining the approval by the House in May of the same year.2 Both the
U.S. and Chinese governments applauded the passage of the Senate bill in September.'
President Clinton said that the landmark U.S.-China Agreement will extend "economic
prosperity at home and promote economic freedom in China, increasing the prospects for
openness in China .... "4 The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the "new
relationship will give both countries a chance to start anew." 5
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at Al.
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Americans have reasons to be happy. In the November 1999 U.S.-China Agreement, all
the trade concessions were on China's part, the price China paid to enter the World Trade
Organization (TO). 6 The United States merely extended to China the terms of trade it
offers to more than 130 countries.7 In the U.S.-China Agreement, China made numerous
concessions ranging from the elimination and liberalization of trade barriers to the opening
of major service markets.8 The bill cleared the way for American companies to take part in
the open markets that China promised to deliver to part of the trade group, and many of
the markets to be opened are ones in which American companies are world leaders2 It is
certainly a better deal for the United States than it is for China. 0
China, however, is more conservative in its greeting of the Senate bill. As China now
shifts its focus to its future membership in the WTO, there is growing trepidation that
China's business and industries are ill prepared for the global competition." This is espe-
cially true for state-owned enterprises in the farming, telecommunication, and banking
industries that have long been sheltered by governmental protection. 2 As a result, it is not
a surprise that China has balked at several of the most politically sensitive concessions it
made in negotiations with the United States just as President Clinton signed the law grant-
ing China's PNTR. 3
B. CHINA'S PROLONGED ROAD TO THE WTO
Although China was a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), China's membership in GATF ended in 1950 when the Nationalist Taiwan Gov-
ernment withdrew from the agreement. 14 More than thirty years passed before China dem-
onstrated an interest in renewing this relationship. In 1982, China obtained observer status
in the GATT.s In July 1986, China formally notified the GATT's contracting parties of its
desire to again participate in the trade agreement. 6 In 1994, China commenced a massive
campaign to join the GATT upon the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, an effort that
culminated in China submitting a formal bid for accession to the WTO on December 7,
1995.17 China's failure to join the GATT in the Uruguay Round means that it has to join
the WTO as a newly acceding government rather than as a GATT contracting party. The
failure may be largely attributed to the fact that China has inherited from the pre-reform
era a nonmarket legal regime that in most respects is incompatible with the market-
6. See David E. Sanger, New Realism Wins the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at A16.
7. See id.
8. See generally Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement [hereinafter Summaryl, at http://
www.uschina.org/public/wto/ustr/generalfacts.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2000).
9. See Schmitt, supra note 3, at A12.
10. See id.
11. Seeid. at Al,A12.
12. See id.
13. See Kahn & Sanger, supra note 1, at Al, A7.
14. See Thomas Yunlong Man, Note, National Legal Recruiting in Accordance with International Norms: GATT/
WTO and China's Foreign Trade Reform, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 471, 474 (1997).
15. See Brad L. Bacon, The Peoples Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United
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based principles of the GAT. As a result, without seeing substantial changes in China's
current legal system, the current GATT members are very nervous about the potential for
disruption.19
Notwithstanding the disagreement on China's joining status and terms, the United States
led the effort to solidify China's membership in the GAT principally aimed at encouraging
China to adopt attitudes and laws consistent with the international norm. ° The U.S.-China
trade agreement on November 15, 1999 certainly finalized the United States' consent and
support of China's entry into the VVTO.2' This landmark deal would also accelerate and
simplify China's bilateral negotiation with other member nations of the VVTO. As of No-
vember 2000, China had completed bilateral negotiations with thirty-five out of thirty-
seven countries whose consent is necessary for China's accession.2 2
C. CHINA'S CONCESSIONS
China's biggest concessions to date are reflected in the November 1999 bilateral trade
agreement with the United States. It is anticipated that such concessions would constitute
the basis of China's negotiation with other W'TO Member States. This article uses the
terms of the U.S.-China bilateral agreement as an example of China's WTO concessions,
a price China paid to enter the WTO. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), such
concessions are mainly reflected in the alleviation of establishment restriction of FDI in
services sectors, and the elimination of performance requirements.
1. Performance Requirements.
China will immediately eliminate all the performance requirements for FDIs, including
but not limited to, export performance requirements, local content requirements, and re-
quirements of mandatory transfer of technology.
2. Foreign Trade Rights
After China's accession, restrictions on foreign trade rights and distribution services will
be progressively phased out over three years.
3. Domestic Distribution and Related Services
China will liberalize wholesaling and related services within three years after accession.
Restrictions on services auxiliary to distribution will also be phased out within four years.
4. Telecommunication
China will permit FDI in telecommunication services to own up to 49 percent after
accession, and that percentage will increase to 50 percent after two years. Also, China will
gradually phase out all geographic restrictions within six years.
5. Banking
China will allow 100 percent foreign ownership of banking entities starting five years
after accession. Foreign banks will be allowed to conduct local currency business with Chi-
19. See Donald C. Clarke, GATT Membership for China?, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REv. 517, 518 (1994).
20. Bacon, supra note 15, at 383.
21. See Erik Eckholm, The Trade Deal: The Overview; U.S. Reaches an Accord to Open China Economy as World-
wide Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at Al.
22. Information in Chinese is available at Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economy of China's official website
at http://moftec.gov.cn/moftec-cn/WTO/wtogx.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
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nese enterprises starting two years after accession, with Chinese individuals starting five
years after accession.
6. Insurance
China will allow foreign companies to own up to 50 percent in life insurance companies
after accession, and branching or wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries for non-life insurance
within two years. Further, China will expand the scope of business for foreign investors to
include group, health, and pension. All geographic limitation will be eliminated within
three years.
7. Securities
China will permit minority foreign-owned joint ventures to engage in fund management
on the same terms as Chinese firms. In addition, 33 percent of foreign-owned ventures will
be allowed to underwrite domestic equity and debt issues.3
D. SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
This article will first introduce the WTO agreements affecting foreign investments. Part
III of the article will have a brief overview of FDIs in China, and China's regulating regime
and restrictions of FDIs. Part IV and V will analyze whether and to what extent China's
FDI regulating system and restrictions conform to the requirements of WTO agreements.
Part VI of the article will introduce several obstacles that would potentially undermine
China's effort to implement its commitments to WTO Member States.
The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM Agreement) and
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) requires the elimination of certain per-
formance requirements from China's laws for Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIE), and al-
leviation of restrictions in the service area. However, it appears that, except in certain major
service areas, China's separate regulating system for FDIs, additional approval procedures,
higher incorporation requirements for FIEs, higher qualification requirements for foreign
investors, and sectoral and ownership restrictions for FDIs, do not violate the mandate of
the WTO.
II. WTO Agreements Affecting FDI
The multilateral trading rules traditionally have focused on cross-border movement of
goods and services. However, some GATT rules relating to the treatment of foreign in-
vestments developed as a result of the more integral relation between trade and investment.
Currently, the WTO regime governing investment mainly consists of two agreements: the
TRIM Agreement and the GATS.
A. TRIM AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The current WTO TRIM Agreement is a compromise between the developed countries
and developing countries1 4 The United States has been the chief proponent of a TRIM
23. See Summary, supra note 8.
24. Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS):
Limitations and Prospects for the Future, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 447 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1996).
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Agreement and has sought to achieve the free flow of investment and elimination of Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIM) by expanding the principle of "National Treatment"
to investment areas." Conversely, developing countries, led by India, Egypt, and the Phil-
ippines, opposed the TRIM Agreement as unnecessary and adverse to their development
interests. 6 The final TRIM Agreement reflected a middle ground between the above two
positions (see infra discussions). Such a compromise not only preserved the existing GAT
protection for investments, but also prevented future negotiations in this area from being
adversely affected."
The TRIM Agreement applies to investment measures related to TRIM only.8 The heart
of the TRIM Agreement lies in article 2, which prohibits WVTO members from applying
any TRIM that is inconsistent with Article III and Article XI of the GATT 1994. An
illustrative list of such TRIMs is contained in the Annex to the TRIM Agreement. Among
those illustrated TRIMs are investment measures that require "the purchase or use by an
enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source"29 (so-called "local
content requirements"), and the "exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of prod-
ucts"30 (so-called "export performance requirements").
It is notable that such TRIMs not only "include those which are mandatory... under
domestic law or administrative rulings," but also those "compliance with which is necessary
to obtain an advantage."' Moreover, the TRIM Agreement imposes the same transparency
and notification obligations on member nations as Article X of the GATT Agreement
1994.32 Each member is obliged to notify the Secretariat of their publications in which
TRIMs may be found, including those applied by regional and local governments within
their territories.33
B. GATS AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
Like the TRIM Agreement, the developed and developing countries also have different
attitudes towards the regulation of trade in services by the VTO.14 The United States,
together with the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD) mem-
bers outside of the European Union (EU), and Singapore, made the most liberal proposal.3
Under such proposal, most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment ob-
ligations would generally apply to a broadly defined trade that includes investment. 6 The
EU proposed that national treatment should only apply to specific services sectors. On the
other hand, many developing countries opposed the negotiation of an agreement covering
25. See id. at 447.
26. See id. at 450.
27. See id. at 451.
28. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. 1, reprinted in PHILIP RAWORTH & LINDA C.
REIF, THE PRACTITIONER's DESKBOOK SERIES: THE LAW OF THE WTO (1995) [hereinafter TRIMAgreement].
29. Id. Annex, para. 1.
30. Id. Annex, para. 2.
31. Id. Annex, para. 1, 2.
32. See id. art. 6.1.
33. See id. art. 6.2.
34. See Michael E. Burke, IV, China's Stock Markets and the World Trade Organization, 30 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L
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trade in service. 7 The final GATS Agreement represents a compromise among the three
initial offers (see infra discussions).
The GATS Agreement applies to measures affecting trade in services s The agreement
covers four types of services: (1) services from one member state into the territory of an-
other; (2) services from one member state for consumers of another; (3) services by an entity
supplier of one member in the territory of another; and (4) services by a natural person of
one member in the territory of another."
The GATS generally imposes an MFN treatment obligation on all trade in services with
several exceptions. 40 The Agreement also, in service sectors as scheduled by a member state,
requires national treatment by such member nation for services and service suppliers of
another member4' Further, a member nation's domestic regulation of general application
affecting trade in services shall be "administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner" in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken by such member.42 As for
market access, "each member shall accord services and service supplier of any other member
treatment no less favorable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and condi-
tions agreed and specified in its Schedule. ' 41 Moreover, the Agreement contains a trans-
parency requirement similar to that of the TRIM Agreement. 4
C. LIMITATION OF THE TRIM AGREEMENT AND GATS
The protection for FDI under the TRIM Agreement, however, is very limited due to
the Agreement's limited coverage of "trade related investment measures only." In this sense,
the TRIM Agreement might be better characterized as a trade agreement, rather than an
investment agreement. The TRIM Agreement contains no rights for investors, except as
derived from protection accorded to trade in goods.45 Nor does the Agreement intend to
address such major issues as barriers to establishment or operation of investment, restric-
tions on repatriation of profits, or the movement of personnel.-
In terms of the breadth of covered protection for investors, the GATS does a better job
than the TRIM Agreement. However, due to the structure of GATS and the nature of its
obligations, the effects of GATS in liberalizing services traders is also, to some extent,
limited.47 First, market access and national treatment under the GATS do not apply un-
conditionally, but only apply to those sectors that a member state has placed on its
37. See id. at 332.
38. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 1 (1), reprinted in RAWORTH, supra note 28
[hereinafter GATS].
39. See id. art. 1 (2).
40. See id. art. II; see also Richard B. Self, General Agreement on Trade in Services, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORCANIZATION, supra note 24, at 527.
41. See id. art. XVII.
42. Id. art. VI.
43. As observed by one scholar, the market-access article does not appear to add anything to the provisions
of the national treatment article insofar as discrimination between foreign and domestic suppliers is concerned.
Richard H. Snape, Reach Effective Agreement Covering Services, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANi-
ZATION 290 (Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1998).
44. GATS, supra note 38, art. III.
45. See Price & Christy, supra note 24, at 453.
46. See id.
47. See Snape, supra note 43, at 287.
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Schedule.4 In other words, if a sector is not scheduled, there is no restriction on the terms
or extent of the barriers to market access that can be imposed by one member on that
sector.49 Second, MFN treatment is also less general and binding than that under the
GATT 5 0 Various exceptions and exemptions for MFN exist under the GATS. 5' Such ex-
ceptions can be taken, and have been taken, for measures applying to major services sectors,
such as financial services and basic telecommunications.52 Third, the GATS also lacks many
important protections found in modern investment agreements, for example, an absolute
ban on performance requirements."
D. FUTURE OF MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT UNDER THE WTO REGIME
The future of a real multilateral agreement on investment is uncertain because such an
agreement, in large part, depends on the political will of member countries.14 First, gov-
ernments of developing countries tend to react suspiciously to attempts to impose on them
unnecessary regulatory requirements that might hinder their development. As discussed
above, developing countries strongly opposed any limitations on TRIMs during the Uru-
guay round negotiation.
Second, lack of incentive in developing countries may be the most detrimental obstacle
to reaching such an agreement. The desire to reach out to the developed countries' huge
consumer market played a major role in prompting developing countries to participate in
trade negotiations that led to the establishment of the WTO. However, such incentive does
not exist with regard to an investment agreement. Quite the contrary, domestic industries
in developing countries, such as China, have called for more investment protection rather
than liberalization.5 5 Furthermore, the absence of an investment agreement, which does
not seem to substantially affect the ability of some developing countries to attract foreign
investments, further complicated the situation. For example, although China implements
numerous restrictions on FDIs (see infra discussion), it is still the second largest importer
of foreign direct investments according to 1996 statistics, after the United States, but ahead
of the United Kingdom and Germany.
5 6
Third, the basic nature of the "AFFO as a forum for the liberalization of cross-border
trade makes reaching such an investment agreement even more difficult.5" In fact, it is
questionable that it would ever be successful to address investment issues in a frame-
work designed to eliminate barriers to trade in goods. As a result, it is not a surprise that
the OECD, not the WTO, first initiated the negotiation of a multilateral investment
agreement.5 8
48. See Self, supra note 40, at 536.
49. See Snape, supra note 43, at 285.
50. See id. at 290.
51. GATS, supra note 38, art. II (3); see also Annex on article II exemptions.
52. See Snape, supra note 43, at 290.
53. See Price & Christy, supra note 24, at 454, 455.
54. See id. at 456.
55. See Schmitt, supra note 3.
56. See Stephen J. Canner, Exceptions and Conditions: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 657, 659 (1998).
57. See id. at 665.
58. See id. at 665, 666.
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HI. FDI and Its Regulating Regime in China
A. FDI IN CHINA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
By the end of 1998, China approved the establishment of 324,620 foreign invested en-
terprises (FIE), with $572.495 billion under the contract and $267.109 billion in foreign
funds actually utilized.' 9 The 150,000 FIEs currently in operation have employed about
eighteen million people in China, which account for 11 percent of the non-agricultural
labor force across the country.60 The amount of tax involving FIEs amounts to nearly RMB
120 billion (not including tariff and land use fees), accounting for 14.38 percent of the
industry and commerce tax of China.6' In 1998 alone, 19,799 FIEs were set up with approval
in the country and the amount of foreign investments in contracts amounted to $52,102.62
Historically, joint ventures (especially Equity Joint Ventures (EJV)) have been the major
form of direct investment in China. In recent years, however, the role of Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise (WFOE) has increased significantly, as have the share of joint ventures
with foreign equity participation relative to contractual joint ventures without foreign
equity.63
According to 1997 statistics, the primary sources of FDI in China were Hong Kong, with
35 percent; the United States with 10 percent; Japan with 7 percent; and Taiwan with 5
percent.64 The primary sectors receiving FDI from all countries, as actually utilized, were
manufacturing, 62 percent; and real estate, 11 percent.6'
Approximately 70 percent of China's inbound FDI is concentrated in the five coastal
provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shanghai, and Shandong.66 This is due partially
to the location of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Economic and Technical Develop-
ment Zones (ETDZ). China has set up five Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, Xiamen,
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Hainan) and steered foreign investments towards these zones by a
variety of incentives.,7 In addition to the SEZs, China also designated fourteen more coastal
cities as well as Pudong New Zone as ETDZs. 1 FIE Enterprises (as well as Chinese do-
mestic enterprises) set up in the SEZs and ETDZs received more favorable income tax and
other treatments than those established elsewhere in the country.69
Direct investment represents the vast majority of foreign investments in China. A 1997
figure shows inflows of $44.2 billion in FDI and only $6.8 in portfolio investment.70 This
59. China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Information on China: Absorption of Foreign
Investments in 1998, at http://www.ccpit.org/engVersion/cp-infor/cp-invest/cp_fvest.html (lastvisited Sept. 22,
2000) [hereinafter CCPIT]. In practice, there may be a lag of several years before the investment projects are
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68. Id.
69. See id. at 2-23.
70. See id. at 2-19.
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is due mostly to various encouragements to FDI in China's laws and regulations on one
hand, and numerous restrictions on foreign portfolio investment on the other.7 The other
possible reason is the relatively small size of China's stock market and limited choices for
foreign investors.72
B. CHINA's REGULATING REGIME OF FDI
1. Separate Regulating System73
In China, foreign investors may incorporate their investments under various laws, and
therefore adopt different forms of enterprises. The collective concept of Foreign Investment
Enterprises (FIE) in China encompasses three types of enterprises: Equity Joint Venture
(EJV),74 Contractual Joint Venture (CJV),75 also translated as Cooperative Joint Venture
and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE).76 Each type of enterprise is governed by
its respective laws and implementing regulations. It is notable that FIE laws and regulations
may be subject to change in the near future. A bill revising three laws on foreign investments
in China was presented to the NPC recently.77
In addition, cooperative exploitation is also an important form of investment adopted
shortly after the initiation of China's open-door policy at the end of the 1970s.7 1 As China
continues to open the country wider to the outside world, there has been a gradual increase
in the forms of investment, including but not limited to Foreign Investment Companies,79
71. See id.; see also GuoWuYuan GuangYu GuLi WaiShang TouZi De GuiDing (Provisions of the State
Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investments) (promulgated on Oct. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Provi-
sions for the Encouragement].
72. See ITC Assessment, supra note 63, at 2-19.
73. See Anyuan Yuan, Foreign Direct Investment In China-Practical Problems of Complying China's Company Law
and Laws for Foreign Invested Enterprises, 20 Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. 475, 478 (2000).
74. The main framework applicable to EJVs are Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo ZhongWai HeZi Jing Ying QiYe Fa) (promulgated
on July 1, 1979, amended on April 4, 1990) [hereinafter EJV Law], and Regulations for the Implementation
of Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated on Sept.
20, 1983, by the State Council, amended on Jan. 15, 1986) [hereinafter EJV Implementation].
75. The main framework applicable to CJVs are Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Contractual Joint Ventures (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo ZhongWai HeZuo JingYing QiYe Fa) (pro-
mulgated on April 16, 1988) [hereinafter CJV Law], and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Law of the
People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures (promulgated on Sept. 4, 1995,
by Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, also called MOFTEC).
76. The main framework applicable to WFOEs are Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprises (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo WaiShang DuZi QiYe Fa) (promulgated on
April 12, 1986) [hereinafter WFOE law], and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Law of the People's
Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (promulgated on Oct. 28, 1988, by the State
Council).
77. See China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, News of Economy and Trade, at http://
www.ccpit.org/engVersion/indexEn.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
78. Cooperative Exploitation is the abbreviation of the "Cooperative Exportation and Exploitation of Off-
shore and Land Petroleum Resources." See ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo DuiWai HeZuo KaiCai HaiYang
ShiYou ZiYuan TiaoLi (Regulation of the PRC on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in
Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises) (promulgated on Jan. 30, 1982); see also ZhongHua RenMin Gong-
HeGuo DuiWai HeZuo KaiCai LuShang ShiYou ZiYuan TiaoLi (Regulation on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative
Exploitation of Land Petroleum Resources of the PRC) (promulgated on Oct. 7, 1993).
79. See generally GuanYu JuBan TouZiXing GongSi De ZanXing GuiDing (Provisional Regulations of the
PRC on Investment Companies Established by Foreign Investors) (promulgated on Apr. 4, 1995).
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Foreign Invested Joint Stock Companies,"' and Foreign Invested Financial Institutions.8'
Moreover, the form of Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) investment was also introduced
into China in recent years.12 Other forms of investment, including Compensation Trade,
Processing and Assembling Operation, and International Lease, have been widely used by
China since the beginning of its open-door policy.
a. Equity Joint Venture
An EJV is a limited liability company (LLC) between the Chinese and foreign investors
in which the foreign investor's capital contribution should not be less than twenty-five
percent of the total registered capital."3 All EJVs are enterprise legal persons8 4 of China.8
The EJV is the principal form adopted by foreign investors in China so far. An EJV may
also possibly adopt the corporate form of Joint Stock Company Limited.16
b. Contractual Joint Venture
A CJV is a company operated under a contract between Chinese and foreign enterprises.87
A CJV is not always a legal person, however, as only CJVs meeting the qualifications of a
legal person under Chinese law may obtain such status.88 A CJV is distinctive from an EJV
based on its (1) flexibility regarding requirements of incorporation, profit distribution, and
the sharing of risk and losses; (2) a CJV need not meet the higher legal standard of legal
person; (3) the forms of capital contribution in CJVs are generally more diversified, and
the contributions of parties may not necessarily be converted into a ratio of investments;
(4) the contract may agree that foreign parties may recoup their investments first; and
(5) they may do so even before the income tax of the CJV is paid.89 The CJV form is most
often utilized in situations where the value of the contributions from investing parties may
not be easily or fairly appraised, such as land-use rights or usable equipments.
80. See generally GuanYu SheLi WaiShang TouZi GuFen YouXian GongSi De ZanXing GuiDing (Provi-
sional Regulations of the PRC on the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock Companies) (promulgated
onJan. 10, 1995).
81. See generally WaiZi JinRong JiGou GuanLi TiaoLi (Regulation of the PRC on Financial Institutions
with Foreign Capital) (promulgated on Feb. 25, 1994).
82. The BOT is used mainly for the construction of infrastructure facilities, such as toll-charged highways,
power plants, and railways. See GuanYu Yi BOT FangShi XiShou WaiShang TouZi YouGuan WenTi De
TongZhi (Circular on the Absorption of Foreign Investment by BOT Form) (promulgated on Jan. 16, 1995).
83. See EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 4. For a discussion of the concept of Registered Capital, see Yuan, supra
note 73, at 487.
84. An "enterprise legal person" in China means a business entity that may independently undertake its civil
liability. See ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo MinFa TongZe (General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC)
art. 37 (promulgated on Apr. 12, 1986, and effective as of Jan. 1, 1987); Zhonglua RenMin GongHeGuo
QiYeFaRen Dengji GuanLi TiaoLi (Regulation for the Registration and Administration of Enterprise Legal
Persons of the PRC) art. 7 (promulgated by State Council on June 3, 1988).
85. See EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 2.
86. See Provisional Regulations of the PRC on the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock Compa-
nies, arts. 1, 2(l)(1).
87. See CJV Law, supra note 75, art. 2. Also translated as Cooperative Joint Venture.
88. See id.
89. See id. arts. 2, 8, 22.
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c. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
A WFOE is a business entity wholly invested in by foreign investors.90 A WFOE may
acquire the legal-person status if it meets the requisite conditions?1 However, the estab-
lishment of VFOEs requires one of the following to be met: that they will apply interna-
tionally advanced technology and equipment, or that all or most of their products will be
export-oriented. 92 In recent years, a WVFOE may also possibly adopt the corporate form of
Joint Stock Company Limited.93
d. Foreign Invested Investment Company
A Foreign Invested Investment Company (FIIC) is a LLC engaging in direct investment
in China.94 A FIIC may be solely established by a foreign investor in the form of a VWFOE,
or co-funded with Chinese investors in the form of an EJV. 95 The incorporation of a FUC,
although as an EJV or WFOE, must go though separate application procedures that are dif-
ferent from those for normal EJVs, CJVs, or WFOEs. Therefore, impliedly, a normally ap-
proved and incorporated FIE may not engage in direct investment, or at least direct invest-
ments made in the name of such FIE may not exceed fifty percent of its net assets (equity).96
e. Limited Liability Company Under Company Law
Arguably, foreign investors may also incorporate a Limited Liability Company (LLC)
under the Company Law.97 Three types of major company forms are provided in the Com-
pany Law: Wholly State-Owned Company (Guo You Du Zi Gong Si), Limited Liability
Company (You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si) (somewhat similar to a closely held corporation in
the United States), and Joint Stock Company Limited (Gu Fen You Xian Gong Si) (also
translated as Company Limited by Shares). Article 18 of the Company Law provides that
the Company Law also applies to foreign-invested limited liability companies. But it is
notable that the governing structure of a LLC incorporated under the Company Law may
be dramatically different from those incorporated under FIE laws. This structural difference
may lead to different outcomes in the protection of minority shareholders' interests (see
infra discussions in Part III).
2. Restrictions and Prohibitions on FDI
Along with preferential treatments,"s Chinese laws and regulations also impose various
restrictions and prohibitions on FDI. Such restrictions and prohibitions may be categorized
90. See WFOE Law, spra note 76, art. 2.
91. See id. art. 8.
92. See id. art. 3.
93. See Provisional Regulations of the PRC on the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock Compa-
nies, arts. 1, 11.
94. See id. art. 1.
95. Seeid. arts. 1, 11.
96. This is the rule for LLCs and Joint Stock Companies Limited established under the Company Law. See
ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo GongSiFa (Company Law of the People's Republic of China), passed on
Dec. 29, 1993, and came into effect on July 1, 1994, art. 12 [hereinafter Company Law]. This fifty percent
rule was sometimes applied to FIEs by government agencies. However, the author does not find any statutory
provision supporting the application of such a rule to FIEs in general.
97. Company Law, supra note 96. For a general overview of the Company Law, see DANIEL ARTHUR LAPRES
& ZHANG YUEJIAO, BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA: TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND FINANCE ch. 5 (1997).
98. For a summary of preferential policies contained in various laws and regulations, see China Council for
the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Laws and Regulations on China: New Frames of China's
Policies Encouraging Foreign Investments, at http://www.ccpit.org/engVersion/cp-law/cp-law3.html (lastvis-
ited Sept. 22, 2000).
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as the following. First, by enacting and enforcing a separate regulating system, FDIs in
China are subject to special approval procedures and qualification requirements; second,
by enforcing an investment guideline, Chinese law also restricts or prohibits FDIs' partic-
ipation or percentage of ownership in certain industries (see infra discussions); third, Chi-
nese law also imposes various performance requirements on FDIs, including but not limited
to export performance requirements, local content requirements, or the balancing of for-
eign currency" (see infra discussions).
IV. Impacts on China's FDI Regulating Regime
A. SEPARATE REGULATING REGIME AND LEGALITY UNDER THE WTO REGIME
1. Separate Regulating System
In the United States, foreign investments are generally subject to the same law insofar
as the establishment of companies is concerned. 0 China, however, enacts and enforces a
separate regulating system for FDIs that mainly consists of FIE laws and regulations. It is
notable that those FIE laws and regulations only regulate the FDI, and do not govern the
pure domestic investments of Chinese nationals. Domestic investments are regulated by a
different regime mainly centered on the Company Law and the Law for Wholly State-
Owned Industrial Enterprises.' 0 As a result of this separate regulating system, FDIs in
China are treated differently from domestic investments in several aspects.
a. Governing Structure
The basic governing structures of FIEs established under FIE law are dramatically dif-
ferent from those established under the Company Law, which is the major corporate law
governing domestic investments. 02
First, under article 3 7 of the Company Law, the shareholder meeting is the LLC's highest
organ of authority.I03 The shareholders' meeting is vested with broad powers to decide and
approve the most important matters of a company such as the company's investment plan,
the company's budget, as well as its profit distribution, the increase or decrease of a com-
pany's registered capital, the issuance of bonds, the amendment of articles of incorporation,
and the merger, division, and dissolution of the company.0 4 Whereas under the EJV law,
a board of directors is the highest organ of authority, the shareholders' meeting is not even
99. Regarding "balance of foreign currency requirements," see generally WFOE Law, supra note 76, art.
18. See also CJV Law, supra note 75, art. 20.
100. For example, New York has eliminated requirements as to citizenship and residence of incorporators.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. ACT, § 401, Legislative Studies and Report (McKinney 1986).
101. The basic statute governing Wholly State-Owned Enterprise is the Law of the PRC on Wholly State-
Owned Industrial Enterprises (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo QuanMin SuoYouZhi GongYe QiYe Fa)
(promulgated on Apr. 13, 1988).
102. Although the Company Law also regulates business entities involving foreign investment, that is, for-
eign invested LLCs (art. 18), joint stock companies (art. 75), and branch or representative offices of foreign
companies (art. 199), the major focus of the Company Law is domestic investments, as implied from the purpose
of the Company Law, stating that the Company Law purports "to regulate and standardize the organization
and conduct of companies, to protect the legitimate interests of companies' shareholders and creditors, and to
stimulate the development of a socialist market economy."
103. However, the Wholly State-Owned Company is an exception. See Company Law, supra note 97, art.
66.
104. See id. art. 38.
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an organ of companies incorporated under the FIE laws.10 All of the above shareholder
powers and functions are performed by the board of directors of FIEs under the FIE laws.
10 6
The second difference regarding the governing structure is the voting structure. Under
the FIE laws, the directors vote by head (each director has a single vote) in the board of
directors meeting. Whereas under the Company Law, the shareholders vote in the share-
holders meeting by the number of shares they represent.10 This difference in voting struc-
ture may lead to dramatically different results in terms of the protection of minority share-
holders' interest.
The third major structural difference is the minority shareholders' veto rights with re-
gards to certain important matters. According to article 36 of EJV Implementation, the
following matters require the unanimous consent of all attending directors (provided that
the meeting meets the two-thirds quorum requirement): (1) modification of an EJV's ar-
ticles of incorporation; (2) termination or dissolution of an EJV; (3) the increase or transfer
of an EJV's registered capital; and (4) the EJVs merger with other business organizations.
This veto power is very crucial for minority shareholders of an EJV to protect their interests
in the joint venture, and to retain a voice in the most important matters of an EJV. By
contrast, the Company Law's structure gives no say at all to minority shareholders. As
discussed above, under the Company Law, shareholder meetings are the organ of authority
for a company and determine all of its most important matters. 08 Because in shareholder
meetings shareholders vote by the number of shares they own, the controlling shareholders
or their representative group would presumably control the voting process and ultimately
the outcome of all important matters, including those matters in which the minority share-
holders of an EJV may have veto rights.
On the face of the law, however, it is difficult to conclude that foreign investors in FIEs,
as a whole, are disadvantaged by the above governing structures. In other words, it is hard
to say that national treatment in this regard (i.e., applying the Company Law to FIEs)
would grant additional benefits to FDIs. But, the majority shareholders in FIEs might have
an argument that they are discriminated against because, by the minority-friendly voting
structure and minority's veto power, the majority shareholders in FIEs apparently exercise
less control over the company than their counterparts in domestic enterprises. However,
assuming that FDIs as a whole are discriminated against in this regard, as discussed below,
such discrimination might not violate the TRIM Agreement or GATS at all.
b. Approval Procedures
In the United States, there is no special approval or registration requirement for foreign
investment.109 However in China, FIEs are subject to special approval procedures that are
not, or at least not evenly, applied to domestic investments. For example, in addition to
the Registration of SAIC, the formation of an FIE in China requires the approval of
MOFTEC.'10 In contrast, domestic companies without the involvement of foreign funds
do not require such approval or any other equivalent process. " '
105. See EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 6; see also EJV Implementation, supra note 74, art. 33.
106. EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 6; see also CJV Law, supra note 75, art. 12.
107. Company Law, supra note 97, arts. 41, 106.
108. Id. arts. 37, 38, 102, 103.
109. RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN A NUTSHELL 197 (2d ed. 2000).
110. See EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 3; CJV Law, supra note 75, art. 5; WFOE Law, supra note 76, art. 6.
111. ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo GongSi DengJi GuanLi TiaoLi (Regulation of the People's Republic
of China on Administration of Registration of Companies) (promulgated on June 24, 1994), art. 3.
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c. Qualification Requirements
With regard to the qualification requirements for the establishment of an FIE, Chinese
law very often imposes higher standards on foreign investors and FIEs, and much lower or
no requirements on Chinese investors or companies. Such qualification requirements may
be characterized in two categories. First, foreign investors are sometimes subject to higher
qualification requirements than their Chinese partners when forming an FIE. For example,
to establish a Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Trading Company, the foreign party must,
besides other requirements, have a turnover of over $5 billion in the year prior to the
application, and enjoy an average annual trading volume of over $30 million in the previous
three years prior to the application."2 In contrast, the requirements for their Chinese part-
ners are much more flexible. The Chinese party only needs, besides other requirements,
an average annual foreign trade volume of over $200 million in the previous three years (of
which no less than half shall be export), and enjoy an average annual turnover of over $10
million in the previous three years.13 Moreover, for the establishment of a Joint Venture
Investments Company, the total assets of the foreign investor one year before the appli-
cation shall be no less than $400 million." 14 The same requirements for the Chinese partner
are merely RMB 100 million."'
Second, FIEs in China are subject to higher establishment standards compared with
domestic companies without the involvement of foreign investments. Such higher standards
include (but are not limited to) the use of advanced technology, promotion of overseas
market, or higher registered capital requirements. For example, article 3 of the FA/OE
Law and article 3 of its implementing rule provide that WFOEs must either transfer ad-
vance technology to their Chinese operation, or export more than fifty percent of their
output value of all products every year. Article 9 of EJV Law and article 4 of the CJV Law
provide that the state encourages the establishment of joint ventures that are either export-
oriented or utilizing advanced technology. The joint venture commercial companies may
best illustrate the example of higher registered capital requirements. Investors shall con-
tribute at least a registered capital of no less than RMB 50 million for a joint venture
commercial company engaging in retail business, and RMB 80 million for a joint venture
engaging in wholesale business." 6 However, for the incorporation of a trading company
with all incorporators as Chinese nationals, only an RMB 300,000 is required for a retail
company, and RMB 500,000 for a wholesale company." 7
2. Legality Under the TRIM and GATS Agreements
The foregoing discussions demonstrate that along with certain preferential treatments,
China also discriminates against FDIs in some aspects by enacting a separate regulating
112. GuanYu SheLi ZhongWai HeZi DuiWai MaoYi GongSi ShiDian ZanXing BanFa (Provisional Mea-
sures on the Establishment of Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Trading Companies on a Trial Basis) (promul-
gated on Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Provisional Measures of JV Trading Companies], art. 4, para. 1.
113. See id. art. 4, para. 2. RMB 100 million is the equivalent of approximately $12 million.
114. See id. art. 2.
115. See id.
116. WaiShang TouZi ShangYe QiYe ShiDian BanFa (The Experimental Measures for Foreign Investment
in Commercial Enterprises) (promulgated on June 25, 1999).
117. See Company Law, supra note 97, art. 23.
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system and setting forth higher establishment standards for FIEs or FDIs in general. The
question is whether such a separate regulating regime for FDIs is permissible under the
VVTO regime. This part of the paper will discuss the effects of both the TRIM Agreement
and the GATS.
a. Effect of the TRIM Agreement
As discussed in Part I, the TRIM Agreement only applies to trade-related investment
measures that could cause trade-restricting or distorting effects" 8 but does not apply to
barriers to the establishment and operation of investments in general." 9 The narrow scope
of the TRIM Agreement is corroborated by the history of the TRIM Agreement and Uru-
guay Round negotiations. The investment discussion in the Uruguay Round is limited to
investment measures with "adverse effects on trade," rather than the broad relationship
between investment, production, and trade. 20 As a result, the TRIM Agreement prohibits
those investment measures with direct and adverse effects on trade, such as local content
requirements and export performance requirements, but does not mandate the national
treatment to the establishment and operation of international investment in general.'2'
China's separate regulating system for FDIs appears to be outside the scope of the TRIM
Agreement. The different treatments of FDIs in China (different corporate structure, spe-
cial approval procedure, and higher qualification requirements), even assumed to be unfair
discrimination, are not directly related to trade in goods, nor are they similar to any illus-
tration to the TRIM Agreement (i.e., various performance requirements). Rather, those
discrimination measures concern the national treatment of foreign investments in general,
which is not mandated by the VTO regime to date. Therefore, China's separate regulating
system would probably pass the test of the TRIM Agreement.
b. Effects of the GATS Agreement
As discussed in Part I, the GATS Agreement has a much broader coverage than the TRIM
Agreement insofar as the effects on FDI are concerned. However, China's separate regu-
lating regime for FDIs does not appear to violate the GATS.
First, the GATS only covers trade in services'22 not the foreign investments in general;
second, even though in the services area, the national treatment and market access obli-
gations under the GATS Agreement only applies to those sectors that a member nation has
placed on its Schedule.3 Therefore, the national treatment and market obligation of the
GATS would only apply to those sectors where China had made specific commitments,
such as banking, distribution, insurance, telecommunications, and securities. 24 So far China
has promised, after the accession, to gradually phase out most of the restrictions in major
service areas listed above. 2 As a result, the above-mentioned qualification requirements
118. TRIM Agreement, supra note 28, at Preface and art. 1.
119. See Price & Christy, supra note 24, at 453.
120. See id. at 447.
121. TRIM Agreement, sutpra note 28, at Annex.
122. GATS, supra note 38, art. l(l).
123. See Self, snpra note 40, at 536; see also GATS, supra note 38, art. XX. Unlike this positive list for coverage
of services under GATS, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFFA) took a negative list approach,
which means all service areas are covered by NAFTA unless specially excluded. North American Free Trade
Agreement (1994), art. 1206, reprinted in RALPH H. FOLSOM, NAFTA IN A NUTSHELL (1999).
124. See Summary, sipra note 8.
125. See id.
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would probably fall within China's commitments and thus would be amended in the near
future. However, the majority of the regulating regime, such as the basic structure of a dual
regulating system, special approval procedure for FDIs, higher incorporation requirements
for FIEs of a manufacturing nature, and higher qualification requirements for foreign in-
vestors in those FIEs, would probably survive China's entry into the WTO.
B. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Chinese law imposes on FIEs broad performance requirements that mainly consist of
local content requirements, export performance requirements, and balance of foreign
currency.12
6
1. Export Performance Requirements
FIE laws in China, to a different extent, impose or compel export performance require-
ments on FIEs. Under article 3 of the WFOE Law and article 3 of its Rule, WFOEs must
either transfer advance technology to their Chinese operation, or export more than 50
percent of their output value of all products every year. Although the EJV and CJV Law
do not impose such mandatory requirements, article 9 of EJV Law and article 4 of the CJV
Law provide that the state encourages the establishment of joint ventures that are either
export-oriented or utilizing advanced technology. The encouraging measures include broad
categories ranging from the preferential terms of land use fees, '27 to the refund of income
tax, 2 ' and to preferential approval procedures for imported manufacturing facilities and
materials. 2 9 By implementing the preferential encouraging measures, Chinese law compels
or induces the FIEs to engage in export-oriented operations.
As discussed above, the TRIM Agreement prohibits Member States from applying any
trade-related investment measures that are inconsistent with the basic principle of national
treatment. 3" Such TRIMs include both the local content requirements and the export
performance requirements.' Further, the impermissible TRIMs not only "include those
which are mandatory under domestic law or administrative rules," but also those "compli-
ance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage."' 32
Applying the TRIM Agreement to China's FIEs, first, the mandatory export performance
requirements under the W'FOE Law apparently do not conform to the TRIM Agreement
since they squarely fall within the illustrated TRIMs. Second, the provisions of EJV and
CJV Law that encourage the export performance are also inconsistent with the WTO
regime. Although EJV and CJV Law do not require mandatory export performance,
however, complying with those provisions is "necessary to obtain an advantage," for ex-
ample, tax reductions.' 3 Thus, these provisions of EJV and CJV Law also violate the TRIM
Agreement.
126. For balance of foreign currency, see CJV Law, supra note 75, art. 20. See also WFOE Law, supra note
76, art. 18.
127. See Provisional Regulation for the Encouragement, art. 4.
128. See id. arts. 7, 8, 9.
129. See id. arts. 12, 13.
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Moreover, China's encouraging measures for export performance might also violate the
WTO Agreement on Subsidiary and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). The
SCM Agreement prohibits any subsidy such as tax credit that is contingent upon export
performance.31 China's major encouraging measure, an income tax refund, would certainly
constitute such impermissible subsidy under the SCM Agreement.
The problem regarding performance requirements, however, might become moot upon
China's entry to WTO, if China fulfills its commitments. In the U.S.-China Agreement,
China had promised to eliminate all performance requirements (including local content
requirement, export performance requirements, and requirements of balance of foreign
currency) immediately after the accession.3 5 Thus, relevant provisions of China's FIE laws
requiring export performance requirements would be eliminated from the FIE laws in the
near future. 1
6
2. Local Content Requirements
"Local content requirement" is an import substitution practice obligating foreign inves-
tors to purchase or use domestic products or services rather than importing those products
or services. Local content requirements are prevalent throughout China's FIE laws. Article
9 of the EJV Law and article 15 of the WFOE Law provide that EJV or WFOE may
purchase its materials and fuels on the Chinese domestic markets or international markets;
however, under the same conditions, China' domestic market should be given priority.
Article 18 of the CJV Law and article 16 of the WFOE Law require that CJVs or WFOEs
shall purchase insurance from insurance companies within the territory of China. Pursuant
to the above provisions, various governmental agencies in China promulgated a number of
detailed local content requirements in various industries. For example, a 1994 automobile
industrial policy imposed local content requirements for passenger vehicles of 40 percent
at start-up, 60 percent by the second year, and 80 percent by the third year.'" A 1998
Circular of Ministry of Information Industries required telecommunication enterprises to
purchase components from domestic suppliers."8
As discussed above, the local content requirements, if mandatorily required or if com-
pliance is necessary to obtain certain advantages, violate the TRIM Agreements. 3 The
above mandatory local content requirements under China's FIE laws certainly fall within
these impermissible categories, and therefore would constitute illegal non-tariff trade bar-
riers after China's accession.
China has promised to eliminate all the local content requirements upon its entry into
the '/TO.' 4° Thus, it is also anticipated that relevant provisions of FIE laws will be amended
accordingly in the near future.
134. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, arts. 1.1, 3.1, reprinted in RAWoRTH,supra
note 28.
135. See Summary, supra note 8.
136. A bill revising three FIE laws had been presented to the NPC. See Yuan, supra note 73.
137. See Bacon, supra note 15, at 406.
138. See id.
139. TRIM Agreement, supra note 28, at Annex.
140. See Summary, supra note 8. However, due to various domestic pressures in developing countries, the
complete elimination of local content requirements might not be so easy. For example, after the establishment
of WTO, Brazil and Indonesia still maintain various local content requirement in the auto sector, and the
United States and Japan had initiated complaints against the above two countries regarding the TRIM violation
in the auto sector. See Robert H. Edwards, Jr. & Simon N. Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive Word Trade
Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 169, 181, 184, 197 (1999).
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V. Impacts on Sectoral Restrictions
A. CHINA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDELINE
1. An Overview
China regulates the direction of FDIs in China by enacting and enforcing a so-called
Investment Guideline (Guideline).' 4' The purpose of this Guideline is to "guide foreign
investment, adapt foreign investments to China's national economic and social development
plan." 142 All foreign investments in China are governed by the Guideline. 41
Under the Guideline, projects involving foreign investments in China would be divided
into four categories: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited. ' The encouraged
categories are those involving advanced technology, or the expansion of overseas markets. 41
On the other hand, foreign investments are restricted or prohibited because they do not
conform to China's economic and social development plan. 46 The restricted and prohibited
categories reflect several common themes that include the protection of national security,
the protection of certain domestic industries, the prevention of environmental pollution,
the restriction of consumer luxuries, or the avoidance of overdevelopment in certain areas. 47
The restricted and prohibited categories involve a number of sectors in a variety of indus-
tries, including, but not limited to, those in the textile industry, petroleum industry, elec-
tronic industry, machine-building industry, and various service sectors. 4 Such service
sectors range from domestic and foreign trade, to telecommunication, finance, and
journalism.49
Moreover, the Guideline imposes ownership restrictions on those restricted categories
that are open to FDI on a trial basis. For example, in all domestic and foreign trade sectors,
the Chinese party must have a controlling stake,'50 including the motor vehicles industry,
and the construction and operation of main railway lines.' In some sectors, wholly foreign-
owned operations are not allowed, including auto transportation.s
2. Permissibility in General Under WTO Regime
The question is whether China's sectoral restrictions, prohibitions, or ownership restric-
tions are permissible under the WTO regime. The problem did not become moot after
China's entry into the WTO because China only promised to lift certain bans in several
service industries. The majority of the restrictions and prohibitions in the Guideline,
141. See ZhiDao WaiShang TouZi FangXiang ZanXing GuiDing (Interim Provisions on Guidance for
Foreign Investment) (promulgated onJune 20, 1995) [hereinafter Provisions on Guidance]; WaiShangTouZi
ChanYe ZhiDao MuLu (Guide Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment) (promulgated on Dec. 29,
2000) [hereinafter Investment Guideline].
142. Provisions on Guidance, supra note 141, art. 1.
143. See id. art. 2.
144. See id. art. 4.
145. See id. art. 5.
146. See id. art. 6.
147. See id. arts. 6, 7; see also Bacon, supra note 15, at 402.
148. See generally Investment Guideline, supra note 141.
149. See id.
150. See Investment Guideline, supra note 141, at XIV.
151. See id. at XIII.
152. See id.
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are concerned with industries with a manufacturing nature, and thus would remain
untouched.'
a. Effect of the TRIM Agreement
As discussed in Part I, the TRIM Agreement only applies to trade-related investment
measures that could cause trade-restricting or distorting effects,"14 but it does not apply to
barriers against the establishment and operation of investments in general.'55 As a result,
all the illustrations in the TRIM Agreement Annex focus on those investment measures
with direct and adverse effect on trade, such as local content requirements and export
performance requirements.
China's general scheme of sectoral restrictions and prohibitions on FDIs under the
Guideline do not quite fit into the limited scope of the TRIM Agreement. The same is true
for China's separate regulating system on foreign direct investment; these sectoral restric-
tions are more related to the establishment of foreign investment in general. Although these
sectoral restrictions might have some distorting effect on trade, they are not directly related
to trade in goods, nor are they similar with any of the illustrations contained in the TRIM
Agreement. Therefore, technologically speaking, the Guideline would probably survive the
mandate of the TRIM Agreement.
b. Effects of the GATS Agreement
As discussed in Part I, the GATS Agreement has a broader coverage than the TRIM
Agreement insofar as the effects on FDI are concerned. However, China's Investment
Guideline, in large part, would probably pass the GATS examinations.
First, as discussed above, the national treatment and market access obligations under the
GATS Agreement only apply to those sectors that a member nation has placed on its
Schedule. 5 6 Therefore, the national treatment and market obligation of the GATS would
only apply to those sectors where China has made specific commitments, such as banking,
distribution, and telecommunications.' 5 The GATS does not cover any of the service sec-
tors that China does not place in its GATS Schedule but still remain in the Investment
Guideline.
Second, the GATS applies to trade in services only, not those industries of a manufac-
turing nature." 8 Although restrictions and prohibitions of FDI in service industries is one
of the major focuses, China's Investment Guideline, in a larger part, covers the manufac-
turing industries. Those restrictions and prohibitions in manufacturing industries would
survive China's entry into the WTO.
Furthermore, even though China decided or promised to place certain sectors into the
Schedule, it still has the right under the GATS to specify the terms, conditions, and qual-
ifications on market access and national treatments in those sectors. 5 " For example, al-
though China made promises in the telecommunication sector, it will only open the tele-
communication service market progressively within six years after accession, and the
153. See Summary, supra note 8.
154. TRIM Agreement, supra note 28, at Preface and art. 1.
155. See Price & Christy, supra note 24, at 453.
156. See Self, supra note 43, at 536; see also GATS, supra note 41, art. XX.
157. See Summary, supra note 8.
158. GATS, supra note 38, art. I.
159. See id. art. XX.
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ownership restriction (Chinese part must have a controlling stake160) would still be perfectly
permissible after six years."'6 In fact, the numbers of sectoral commitments made by member
nations are historically low. Within a maximum of around 150 service sectors, most devel-
oped countries have made commitments in more than seventy sectors; transition economies




In sum, a large part, if not most of the restrictions and prohibitions in service industries
listed in China's Investment Guideline, will continue to exist, at least for a certain period
of time, after China acquires the WTO membership.
3. Protectionism v. Reasonable Restriction
The total elimination of sectoral or ownership restrictions is unrealistic for China as a
developing country.'16 In fact, sectoral restrictions on FDIs also exist in developed coun-
tries. 64 For example, in the United States, there are several degrees of restrictions on
FDIs.' 6 There may be total prohibition from FDIs in certain sectors (nuclear power, mar-
itime activities), or strict regulation (airlines, financial services, communications), or limits
on equity ownership (limited to minority shares)166 However, the difference is whether the
restrictions are narrowly tailored for some specific purposes (e.g., national security), or so
broad that they become the cloak of general protectionism for domestic industries. Al-
though China's broad sectoral restrictions, in large part, do not technically violate the
WTO mandates, they apparently exceed the scope necessary and reasonable for the pro-
tection of certain specific interests (e.g., national security).
B. AN EXAMPLE: FOREIGN TRADE RIGHTS
Historically, China modeled its foreign trade practices on other socialist countries, and
adopted a system of state control of foreign trade soon after the foundation of the PRC in
1949.167 After the introduction of the open-door policy in the late 1970s, China launched
a far-reaching reform of its foreign-trade system and ended the thirty-year monopoly over
foreign trade by the state-owned foreign trade companies. 68 Such reform increased both
the number of entities engaging in foreign trade and the diversification of foreign traders169
1. Foreign Trade Rights For Chinese Domestic Enterprises
For companies owned by Chinese nationals and enterprise legal persons, the foreign trade
rights were mainly administered by a licensing system. A would-be foreign trade dealer in
160. See Investment Guideline, supra note 141.
161. See Summary, sopra note 8.
162. See Snape, supra note 43, at 287 (the data predated the conclusions of the telecommunication and
financial services agreements).
163. China is generally deemed as a developing country, although it is unclear whether China might be able
to accede into the WTO as a developing country.
164. See FOLSOM, supra note 109, at 195.
165. See Don Wallace, Jr. & David B. Bailey, Erceptions and Conditions: The Inevitability of National Treatment
of Foreign Direct Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow Erceptions, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 615, 627 (1998).
166. See id,
167. See Mark Williams & ZhongJianhua, The Capacity of Chinese Enterprises to Engage in Foreign Trade: Does
Restriction Help or Hinder China's Trade Relation?, 8J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 199 (1999).
168. See id.
169. See id.
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China who intends to engage in the import and export of goods and technologies shall
acquire a permit from the responsible authority after meeting certain requirements."'1
2. Foreign Trade Rights for Foreigners
Under current China law, wholly foreign-owned operations are not allowed to engage
in foreign trade in China. 7' A foreign investor may only engage in foreign trade practice
in China indirectly by one of the following two ways.
a. Joint Venture Trading Companies
A joint venture trading company is a business entity between foreign and Chinese com-
panies specializing in the import and export trade. 7 All joint trading companies are limited
liability companies in which the shares of the Chinese party in the registered capital must
be no less than 51 percent, and the legal representative' 7' of which shall be appointed by
the Chinese party.7 4 Also, the joint venture trading company shall have a registered capital
of no less than RMB 100 million.''
Apart from the above requirements regarding the joint venture companies, both the
Chinese and foreign party to a joint venture company must also fulfill certain qualification
requirements. The foreign party must (1) have a turnover of over $5 billion in the year
before the application; and (2) enjoy an average annual trading volume of over $30 million
in the three years before the application investment of over $30 million in China.'76 In
contrast, the requirements for the Chinese party are more flexible. The Chinese party must
(1) have foreign trade rights; (2) have an average annual foreign trade volume of over $200
million in the previous three years, of which no less than half shall be export; and
(3) establish more than three branches outside China having an average annual turnover of
over $10 million in the previous three years.' 77
b. FIEs in General
All FIEs in China automatically enjoy the foreign trade privilege, without the need for
obtaining the license or permit, to the extent that they import non-production goods for
their own use, equipment, raw materials, and other goods necessary for the manufacturing
and exporting of their own products. 7"
3. Effects of China's Entry into the WTO on Foreign Trade Rights
The above discussions reveal that current China law treats Chinese nationals differently
from foreigners in terms of the grant and exercise of foreign trade rights. The differences
170. See ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo DuiWai MaoYi Fa (Foreign Trade Law of the PRC), art. 9 (May
12, 1994) [hereinafter Foreign Trade Law].
171. See Investment Guideline, spra note 141.
172. See Provisional Measures in the Establishment of Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Trading Companies on
a Pilot Basis, art. 2 (Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Provisional Measures of JV Trading Companies].
173. For a detailed discussion of the concept of Legal Representative in China, see Yuan, svpra note 73,
at 490.
174. See Provisional Measures of JV Trading Companies, supra note 174, art. 3.
175. See id. art 4, para. 3.
176. See id. art. 4, para. 1.
177. See id. art. 4, para. 2.
178. See Foreign Trade Law, supra note 170, art. 9; EJV Law, supra note 74, art. 9; EJV Implementation,
supra note 74, arts. 57, 60, 62, 63; CJV Law, supra note 75, art. 19; WFOE Law, supra note 76, art. 15; WFOE
Rule, supra note 76, arts. 44, 46-48.
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are not only manifested as a general prohibition on foreign companies to engage in import
and export trade in China (except by joint ventures), but also the more stringent qualifi-
cation requirements on foreign investors when participating in a joint venture trading com-
pany, and the ownership restriction (no more than 49 percent) on such foreign investors.
Although as discussed in Part III, such discrimination did not necessarily run afoul of
China's obligations under the GATS Agreement; China has promised, after the entry of
WTO, to progressively eliminate all restrictions in the foreign trade area within three years.
Thus, three years after China acquired the WTO membership, foreign investments would
presumably enjoy the national treatment and MFN in obtaining foreign trade rights in
China.
VI. Challenges and Obstacles for China79
The above discussion was based on an assumption that China would successfully and
smoothly implement its commitments and obligations to the WTO. However, several po-
tential obstacles exist that may substantially undermine China's efforts to carry out its com-
mitments. These obstacles range from the reform of China's state-owned enterprises
(SOE), to the transparency of laws and regulations, to the elimination of local protections.
A. CHINA'S REFORM OF SOEs
The success of China's reformation of its SOEs is crucial to the implementation of
China's obligations under the GATT and WTO agreements.10 The failure of such reforms
may cause the excessive bankruptcy of SOEs, and expose some seventy million Chinese to
unemployment and loss of post-retirement pension.t " '
Under the GATT, SOEs are required to make purchases or sales solely in accordance
with commercial consideration, such as price, quality, availability, and marketability82 In
other words, SOEs are supposed to be on equal footing in commercial transactions and
competitions with private business sectors.
SOEs in China, however, have heavily relied on governmental protection. There always
exist significant political and economic pressure in China to retain some form of protection
for SOEs after China's entry into the WTO. 8 3 The governmental protection of SOEs in
China may not necessarily involve direct subsidies, which the Chinese government has tried
to eliminate in the past two decades. Rather, it normally takes the form of favorable policy
treatments, examples of which include the uneven giving of certain quotas or licenses, the
grant of certain monopolies in certain business sectors within a certain geographical area,
and the guaranty of government procurement contracts. In addition, the non-economic
179. Part of this title is based on the author's personal observations and opinions, and may not necessarily
reflect or be supported by generally-accepted views.
180. More than forty-four percent of China's SOEs are losing money according to the World Bank, and
SOEs in China face U.S.$200 billion in bad debts, which constitute more than twenty percent of China's bank
loans. See Bacon, supra note 15, at 430, 431.
181. See Burke, supra note 34, at 325.
182. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), art. XVII(1), reprinted in RAWOR-rH, supra note 134
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
183. There are general perceptions in China that SOEs are not yet ready for the anticipated post-WTO
competitions. See Smith, supra note 2, at Al.
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policy loans from the state-owned financial institutions, which were generally not justified
by the SOEs' financial conditions and would not be contracted but for the government's
interference, may also arguably constitute a kind of indirect subsidy.114
The Chinese government has tried various ways to reform SOEs in the past two decades.
The continuing efforts include (1) improving the efficiency, competition consciousness, and
risk-taking ideas in most of the SOEs by decentralizing the decision-making process;
(2) while retaining control, privatizing some of the SOEs by publicly issuing stocks and
debt instruments; (3) encouraging the participating of foreign investments in most of sec-
tors; and (4) leasing or selling small-scale SOEs to private sectors.
Notwithstanding the Chinese government's well-intended efforts, the longtime problems
might not be easily resolved within one night. Moreover, the SOEs' role as service providers
of certain social functions such as post-retirement pensions, education, and health care,
certainly exacerbate the difficulty and bitterness of the reform. In fact, SOEs themselves in
China have been crying that they are not ready for the coming of the wolf-WTO.
B. TRANSPARENCY OF LAW
Article X (1) of the GA"TT provides that all "trade-related laws, regulations, judicial
decisions and administrative rulings of general application ... shall be published promptly
in such a manner as to enable trades to become acquainted with them." The purpose is to
ensure "WTO members ... administer published laws in a uniform, impartial and reason-
able manner."'18
China's current legal system, however, still manifests an overall lack of transparency. First,
China's laws and regulations are highly generalized and replete with ambiguities. The im-
plementation of such laws and regulations to a large degree relies on the discretion of
bureaucrats. To make this situation worse, interpretations by judicial tribunes of these skel-
etal laws and regulations do not have any legal precedent effects on later transactions or
litigations. Second, China does not have an official compilation system for laws and regu-
lations. Although the State Council, the MOFTEC, and the People's Supreme Court issue
periodical publications (called Gazette) containing laws and regulations, these publications
are not always complete or updated. So are the situations of various commercial compila-
tions in China. Third, similarly, there is no official compilation for local rules and regula-
tions. As a result, it is sometimes very difficult to retrieve a law or regulation in China, even
for a native professional practitioner.
Although China is moving toward a more transparent, rule-based legal system, Rome
was not built in a day. In the short term, the transparency of law problem will constitute a
big challenge to China's implementation of its obligations under the WTO agreements.
C. LOCAL PROTECTIONISM
China also has to address its local protectionism, which is to some extent prevalent and
notorious. The cost of failure to do so may be very high because the WTO disciplines
impose responsibility for local government action on central government. 86 Thus the Bei-
184. For more discussion in this regard, see Bacon, rupra note 15, at 430.
185. See GATT 1947, supra note 182, art. X (3)(a).
186. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, para. 13, reprinted in RAWORTH, rupra note 134.
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jing central government would be responsible for any illegal protectionism action of any
local government within the territory of China.
The local protectionism impedes the free movement of goods and services, which is a
basic goal of the WTO. Due to difficult local interest, many local governments in China
try various means to protect their locally-owned business from competing with other lo-
calities, or to protect their local interest to the detriment of other localities. Such local
protectionism may take various forms, including (1) at the legislative level, enacting local
rules aiming to protect local interests; (2) at the judicial level, refusing to enforce other
courts' judgments against local interests or distorting the law to render favorable judgments
for local interests; and (3) at the administrative level, setting up physical check points block-
ing the inflow of goods from other localities.
Although the central governmental has repeatedly demanded the removal of local pro-
tections, its orders are often ignored with impunity by local authorities.'87 A completely
independent legal system would be the ideal solution for this problem. However, the es-
tablishment of such a system is impossible under China's current one-party political struc-
ture. Therefore, local protectionism would probably continue to threaten the central gov-
ernment's effort to insure the free flow of goods in China.
VII. Conclusion
China's entry into the WTO necessitates the elimination of local content and export
performance requirements from China's laws for FIEs, and the alleviation of restrictions
in major service areas. However, it appears that except in certain major service areas, China's
separate regulating system for FDIs, additional approval procedures, higher incorporation
requirements for FIEs, higher qualification requirements for foreign investors, and sectoral
and ownership restrictions for FDIs, do not run afoul of the WTO's mandate. At the same
time, several obstacles might potentially threaten China's effort to implement its commit-
ments to the WNTO. National treatment of FDIs in China, with only limited and reasonable
exceptions, probably have a long way to go.
187. See Clarke, supra note 19, at 527.
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